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INTRODUCTION

Justice Antonin Scalia was a commanding figure on the Supreme Court, whether one agreed or disagreed with him. He favored bright-line rules and, except for the freedom of speech
cases, in which he tended to vote with the more liberal justices,
he was a reliable vote for the conservative side in the culture
wars: from abortion, law and order, and LGBTQ rights to the separation of church and state.
His passing and his replacement will dramatically affect the
Court's role in the religious culture wars and most markedly in
the relationship between church and state that is mediated by the
Establishment Clause.2 Assuming that the Republican-controlled
US Senate will not confirm President Barack Obama's nomination of Judge Merrick Garland, the forty-fifth president will determine the course of church-state relations with the next Supreme Court appointment. In my view, aside from foreign policy
and the battle against religiously fueled terrorism, this is the
most momentous issue that the next president will face.
During Scalia's tenure, the Establishment Clause and the
principle of separation between church and state were steadily
reduced in scope and effect, and his was a critically important
vote to that end. It's not that he was a swing vote like Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy, but rather that he
was a deeply reliable vote to deflate the Establishment Clause. In
closely decided case after closely decided case, he voted with a

t Senior Fellow, Program for Research on Religion and Urban Civil Society, University of Pennsylvania; Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
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See, for example, Texas u Johnson, 491 US 397, 398, 406 (1989) (holding that burning an American flag during a protest rally was expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment).
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See US Const Amend I.
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majority or plurality of the Court to neuter and diminish the Establishment Clause. He did not write terribly often in this field.
His role and views in this arena were part of a larger social movement to be sure. Starting with the Moral Majority appearing in
1979 and flourishing until the end of the 1980s,3 continuing with
the rise of the evangelical Christians as a political force on the
right, and followed by the 2009 Manhattan Declaration,4 in which
Catholic bishops joined forces with some evangelical leaders to
pursue a shared conservative agenda, there have been increasing
calls for treating the Establishment Clause as redundant of the
Free Exercise Clause.5
This unfortunate development erases some of the worst history involving religion in the United States. The "separation of
church and state" was a concept derived by the Baptists who lived
under a tyrannical established church in Massachusetts.6 While
it is true that many escaped England and other parts of Europe
to find religious liberty in colonial America, they did not arrive
here with the concept of separating church and state. 7 By and
large, they came here to set up a society with a theocracy in which
their faith dominated.8 That was the governing model they knew.
The sheer size of the country made it possible to have multiple
theocracies operating simultaneously, especially when there was
no overarching federal, national government. 9 But some, like the
Baptists and the Quakers, felt the sting of oppression just as they
had in Europe. 10 The Baptists introduced a novel way of dealing
with church and state by conceptualizing a division of power that
prevented the state from coercing their beliefs and worship and
from taxing them for not following the beliefs and worship practices of an established church."1 The very concept of dividing

3 See Doug Banwart, Jerry Falwell, the Rise of the Moral Majority, and the 1980
Election, 5 W Ill Historical Rev 133, 133-35 (2013).
4 Manhattan Declaration:A Call of Christian Conscience (Nov 20, 2009), archived
at http://perma.cc/N3S4-KR3C.
5
See, for example, Robert G. Natelson, The OriginalMeaning of the Establishment
Clause, 14 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 73, 90 (2005).
6
See Marci A. Hamilton and Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of Disestablishment Principles, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1755, 1773-76 (2006).
7 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 247 (Belknap 1992).
8

Id.

9 See Hamilton and Steamer, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1765-67 (cited in note 6)
(describing the diversity of religious establishments in the colonies and the states).
10 Id at 1770.
11 Id at 1773-75.
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power between church and state was radical, but it was in response to the oppression the Baptists (and the Quakers) experienced in Massachusetts and elsewhere. 12
Since the Moral Majority appeared on the political scene, socalled social conservatives have attempted to make "separation"
a dirty word and to turn the Establishment Clause into a prop for
the Free Exercise Clause, rather than an independent principle.
The goal of some in this movement is to make the United States
a "Christian nation" that is based on explicitly Christian principles.13 The modern antiseparation theory of the Establishment
Clause has been that the only purpose of the Establishment
Clause is to further religious exercise.14 In other words, the Establishment Clause is always supposed to serve the ends of believers-a potential limitation solely on government-and never
supposed to punish believers for overstepping boundaries. The
"separation" of church and state is an epithet antithetical to their
agenda of retaking the United States as a "Christian nation,"
even though it was never monoreligious.15 When combined with
the push for hyperprotection of religious conduct through the
overreaching Religious Freedom Restoration Acts starting in the
early 1990s, which also have been the darling of the evangelical
right, 16 we came close to opening the doors to a new United States
of individual theocracies with citizens painfully aware of differences in faith-or worse, a single politically powerful dominant
faith determining public policy that is in turn imposed on those
with different beliefs.
This movement was abetted by the conservative Supreme
Court justices who introduced a similar line of reasoning. Scalia
Id.
13 Kevin M. Kruse, A Christian Nation? Since When? (NY Times, Mar 14, 2015),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/opinion/sunday/a-christian-nation-sincewhen.html (visited June 9, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (citing a 2015 poll that
showed a majority of Republicans favored officially making the United States a Christian
nation).
14 See, for example, Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 542 US 1, 46-54
(2004) (Thomas concurring) (raising a historical argument that the clause is a federalism
provision intended to prevent the federal government from interfering with state religious
establishments); Natelson, 14 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J at 90 (cited in note 5) ("If the Establishment Clause exists to serve the Free Exercise Clause, then in the event of conflict, the
former must yield.").
15 Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution at 247-49 (cited in note 7);
Hamilton and Steamer, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 1755 (cited in note 6).
16 For the federal statute, see the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L
No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq. See also Marci A. Hamilton,
Development of State RFRA Statutes (RFRA Perils), archived at http://perma.ce
/N5UJ-U9EG.
12
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was famous for decrying separation principles and doctrine, for
example, in his dissent to Lee v Weisman.17 Justice Clarence
Thomas is known for his argument that state and local governments are not bound by the Establishment Clause, as in his concurrence in Town of Greece, New York v Galloway.18 And Justice
Samuel Alito has issued two extreme readings of the religious
freedom statutes that border on a prescription of religious control
of public policy in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc19 and Holt v
Hobbs.20 There was hardly an expenditure for the benefit of religious entities that struck Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas as a bad idea, as seen in their plurality in Mitchell v Helms.21 Alito also initiated his residence at
the Court with a plurality opinion that would drastically limit the
ability of citizens to sue their governments for violating the Establishment Clause, with Scalia and Thomas chiming in that
there should be no taxpayer standing under the Establishment
Clause at all in Hein v Freedom from Religion Foundation.22Finally, the modern conservative justices (Chief Justice John Roberts and Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) joined forces to open
the door to prayers to start town meetings in Galloway.23 The attempt to write the Establishment Clause out of the First Amendment, however, was incomplete when Scalia passed away.
The key points here are that so many of the recent Establishment Clause cases have been 5-4 decisions and that Scalia was
among the plurality or the majority. With the retirement of
O'Connor and the appointment of Alito, all of a sudden there were
five solid votes to restrict or to do away with Establishment
Clause principles whenever they limited religious entities' options. Instead this new majority could interpret the Establishment Clause as redundant with the Free Exercise Clause, solely
intended to protect religious entities, as opposed to operating as
a separation-of-powers principle for both government and religious entities.24 Scalia repeatedly voted for the proposition that
only strong "coercion" could violate the Establishment Clause,

505 US 577, 633-37 (1992) (Scalia dissenting).
134 S Ct 1811, 1835-38 (2014) (Thomas concurring).
19 134 S Ct 2751 (2014).
20
135 S Ct 853 (2015).
21 530 US 793 (2000).
22 551 US 587, 637 (2007).
23 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1815.
24 Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 Conn L
Rev 807, 824-28 (1999). See also Marci A. Hamilton, A Reply, 31 Conn L Rev 1001, 100208 (1999).
17

18
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and derided the concept introduced by O'Connor that the government violates the Establishment Clause when it "endorses" a religious viewpoint.25 There was every reason to believe that Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito would bury O'Connor's
"endorsement" test (because what could possibly be wrong with
the government endorsing Christianity?) and reduce the Establishment Clause to a "coercion" principle that would permit religious entities broad power and latitude to operate in conjunction
with government.
Yet, Scalia passed away before the Roberts Court could further restrict the Establishment Clause by eliminating the concept
of "separation." Instead, with his passing, Establishment Clause
principles and values now weigh in the balance. If Scalia is replaced with a like-minded religious conservative, it is highly
likely that the Establishment Clause could become effectively
nonjusticiable. If he is replaced with a more liberal justice who
respects the need for separation of church and state, the moment
when the Court could have done away with the separation of
church and state altogether will have passed.
There are three arenas (and many others beyond the capacity
of this short piece to address) in which a Republican replacement
for Scalia could cement the drive to set aside separation principles
while a Democratic nominee could bring Establishment Clause
principles back from the brink. I will focus on three bellwether
cases decided since 2000 to explain what is at stake.
I. FUNDING, PRAYER, AND STANDING

A.

Funding

In Mitchell, the Court addressed whether a federal program
providing computers to schools could also provide computers to
private, religious schools.26 Americans United for Separation of
Church and State argued that the state may give textbooks on
secular subjects to religious schools without violating the Establishment Clause, because those textbooks cannot be diverted to
religious purposes. 27 But the computers were so easily diverted to

25

See, for example, Lamb's Chapel u CenterMoriches Union Free School District,508

US 384, 400-401 (1993) (Scalia concurring) ("What a strange notion, that a Constitution
which itself gives 'religion in general preferential treatment . . . forbids endorsement of
religion in general.").
26 Mitchell, 530 US at 801-04 (plurality) (Thomas).
27 Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, American Federation of
Teachers, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Americans United for
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religious ends that religious entities should not have been permitted to receive them.28
Justice Scalia joined the plurality that reasoned that, so long
as the government's purpose is neutral at the time of the delivery
of the educational product, the donation cannot be tarred with an
Establishment Clause violation, because all subsequent uses are
determined by private actors, not the government. 29 In other
words, the Establishment Clause stops at the schoolhouse door.
In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote, for herself and Justice Stephen Breyer, that this should be a fact-based inquiry, and
that, given the paucity of evidence that any of the computers had
been diverted to religious ends, the Establishment Clause had not
yet been violated.30 She disagreed with the plurality's reasoning
that there is a magical moment after which the courts must ignore the diversion of government funding to sectarian purposes. 31
The three in dissent were persuaded that the significant potential for diversion to religious purposes was sufficient to find an
Establishment Clause violation.32
If Scalia's vote were removed, the plurality would be knocked
down to three votes for a strong theory of "coercion"; there were
two votes to wait and see whether there would be diversion, and
three votes for a strong Establishment Clause presumption of divertability. A Republican replacement is likely to keep the strong
version of "coercion" a live theory at the Court, while a Democratic
replacement is more likely to turn the tide toward a willingness
to find Establishment Clause violations in circumstances in
which the government's funding can be commandeered by the religious entity to private, religious ends.
B.

Government-Sponsored Prayer

In Galloway, the Court split 5-4 on whether the town's practice of opening town meetings with a prayer since 1999 was constitutional.33 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority,
which held that the town's system was inclusive enough to avoid
Separation of Church and State, Anti-Defamation League, Hadassah, Jewish Council for
Public Affairs, and People for the American Way Foundation in Support of Respondents,
Mitchell u Helms, Docket No 98-1648, *23-24 (US filed Oct 1, 1999) (available on Westlaw
at 1999 WL 787898).
28 See id at *17-23.
29 Mitchell, 530 US at 809-814 (plurality) (Thomas).
30 Id at 864-65 (O'Connor concurring).
31 Id at 840-42 (O'Connor concurring).
32 Id at 903-10 (Souter dissenting).
33 134 S Ct at 1813-15.
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being either subtly or overtly coercive.34 Scalia joined Justice
Thomas to reject "subtle" coercion as the appropriate test, and instead set the mark at whether there is a "coercive state establishment[ ]" like those in place at the time of the Framing.35 The four
in dissent would have held the practice unconstitutional because
the record was weak on inclusion of all faiths.36
If one removed Scalia's vote, Thomas would stand alone with
an extreme interpretation that reduced the Establishment Clause
to a nonforce. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Kennedy
took a conservative but less extreme position, and four members
of the Court took the position that the Establishment Clause has
teeth. If Scalia's vote were to be swapped out for another appointee like himself or even one somewhat more moderate on these
issues, like Kennedy, the result would stand: cities can institute
prayer to open town meetings. If Scalia were to be replaced by an
appointee who takes the position that the Establishment Clause
should have teeth, the result would be reversed and cities would
be deterred from instituting religious observances prior to town
meetings.
The next appointment thus could change the landscape of
church-state relations in the public square, with a Republican embedding a presumption against Establishment Clause violations
while, conversely, a Democrat likely would revive the concept of a
meaningful separation between church and state.
C.

Taxpayer Standing

While Scalia persistently joined positions that make it harder
to win Establishment Clause claims, he also favored making it
impossible to bring such claims in the first place. Scalia was a
critic of Flast v Cohen,37 which granted taxpayers standing to institute Establishment Clause claims against a government. 38
In Freedom from Religion Foundation, the Court had an opportunity to overrule Flast, and Scalia and Thomas were strongly
in favor.39 That would have shut down a great many Establishment Clause challenges to government funding. But Alito, in his
Id at 1824-28.
Id at 1837-38 (Thomas concurring).
Id at 1851-52 (Kagan dissenting).
37 392 US 83 (1968).
38 Id at 88.
39 551 US at 637 (Scalia dissenting) ("Flast'slack of a logical theoretical underpinning has rendered our taxpayer-standing doctrine such a jurisprudential disaster that our
appellate judges do not know what to make of it. . . . It is time-it is past time-to call
an end.").
34
35
36
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first Religion Clause opinion, found a middle ground that did not
fully reverse Flast but rather reduced its scope, thereby limiting
the instances in which taxpayers can challenge government
spending that benefits religious entities. On Alito's reasoning, the
taxpayers in that case lacked standing because the funds originated from the executive branch rather than Congress.40 In effect,
the Court halted lawsuits against the federal government for its
increasing willingness to fund religious social missions, and
opened the door to more church-state collaboration on funding
simply by making the funds discretionary in the executive branch
rather than plainly identified in Congress.
Again, without Scalia, Thomas's position appears more extreme by comparison, but the prospect of eliminating taxpayer
standing altogether becomes less of a threat. A Republican appointment to fill his seat might well set the Court back on track
to overruling Flast, but a Democratic appointment is likely to secure a stronger position for those who would sue the government
for spending that favors or privileges religious entities.
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND JUSTICE SCALIA
Justice Scalia was the author of the Supreme Court's majority decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith,41 which reaffirmed the Supreme
Court's dominant approach to free exercise cases, holding that
neutral and generally applicable laws are subject to rationality
review (the easiest level of review for the government), but that
laws targeting religion are subject to the Court's most serious
level of scrutiny.42 This approach was confirmed by the Court in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah.43As with
so much of Scalia's authorship, the Smith opinion sought to be
definitive and set out bright-line principles. The definitive announcement of the governing standard-even if the same standard was used in the "vast majority" of cases-took religious entities by surprise.44

Id at 605-09.
494 US 872 (1990).
42 See id at 877-78 (contrasting laws that single out specific religious practices with
generally applicable laws having incidental effects on the exercise of religion). See also
generally Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v Smith at the Supreme Court: The
Justices, the Litigants, and the DoctrinalDiscourse, 32 Cardozo L Rev 1671 (2011).
43 508 US 520, 524 (1993).
44 Smith, 494 US at 885.
40
41
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This is not the place to go into the details, but I have documented at length in my previous writings that the Smith decision
did not alter the primary decisionmaking structure in free exercise cases. 45 To the contrary, it was consistent with the "vast majority" of the Court's doctrine, to quote the Smith opinion.46 But
the case did generate extreme opposition from religious quarters,
because it definitively rejected the more generous standard that
religious litigators and entities had been seeking to insert into
free exercise doctrine since 1963 and Sherbert v Verner.47 Scalia's
sharp and clear summary of past free exercise cases sent a
strong-and to them, disturbing-message that their mission to
tilt the free exercise scale heavily in their direction was doomed.
Religious litigators, lobbyists, and entities, as well as some
leading law professors, declared war on the Supreme Court and
turned to Congress for the unprecedented, generous protection
they had been unable to persuade the Court to provide. They
formed the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, which in
turn pushed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act48 (RFRA) in
Congress.49 Despite the "restoration" in the title, when enacted,
RFRA put into place a regime like no other before it. Suddenly,
the government could not defend laws because they were neutral
and generally applicable, but rather every law in the country
could now be challenged by believers, who could force the government to satisfy a more demanding standard than the Court had
ever employed in the free exercise cases.50
There was a time when it was conceivable that a new justice
replacing Scalia might move the Court back toward the religious
entities' preferred standard, which is now enshrined in RFRA.
But the course of RFRA has shown it to be a generator of social
conflict and cultural warfare and anathema to the free markets.
It was first supported by conservative groups to overcome the
spread of state fair housing laws that banned discrimination on
the basis of marital status.5 1 That seed of discriminatory intent
has fully bloomed in the current movement to use state-level

See, for example, Hamilton, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1671-74 (cited in note 42).
Smith, 494 US at 885.
47 374 US 398 (1963).
48 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq.
49 For a detailed description of free exercise standards and the legislative history
behind RFRA, see Marci A. Hamilton, God us. the Gavel: The Perils of Extreme Religious
Liberty 1-38, 239-78 (Cambridge 2015).
50
See Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, CongressionalPower and
Religious Liberty after City of Boerne v Flores, 1997 S Ct Rev 79, 101-05.
51 Hamilton, God us. the Gavel at 232-36 (cited in note 49).
45
46
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RFRAs to permit discrimination against same-sex couples and
the LGBTQ community generally, the rights of whom in turn
have been stunted in numerous states because of the open push
to use religious "liberty" to discriminate against others in the free
market.52 In addition, the increasing understanding of courts,
prosecutors, and the public of seriatim child sex abuse in religious
institutions as well as worldwide extremist Islamic terrorism
have made it virtually impossible to support any doctrine that
places blind trust in religious institutions or individuals to be ungoverned by law.53 Therefore, the era for the Supreme Court to
embrace the misguided standard of RFRA or even strict scrutiny
across all laws has passed.
Thus, it is my view that Scalia's passing is unlikely to affect
the Court's Free Exercise of Religion doctrine. Correlatively, it is
too late to turn RFRA back into the sheep it appeared to be when
it was first proposed to Congress. Its dangers are now fully apparent. With Scalia on the Court, RFRA was increasingly understood
for what it is-an uncontrollable standard that invites not liberty,
but rather imposition of faith on others who have different beliefs-and with his passing it is unlikely that the RFRA genie will
be stuffed back into the bottle.
CONCLUSION

With Justice Scalia's passing, the stakes are especially high
in the Establishment Clause arena, but not as high in the Free
Exercise context. It is rational to assume that the currently Republican-controlled Senate will persist in refusing to confirm
President Obama's selection of Judge Garland, and, therefore,

52 Marci A. Hamilton, The 2016 RFRA Decline Is Due to the Difficulty of Selling Discrimination and Child Endangerment as Good Policy (Justia, Feb 23, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/AXN9-7UUR; Marci A. Hamilton, Indiana Leads the Way with an Outrageous RFRA Proposal Again (Justia, Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PC8EANW5. For several infographics detailing which states have enacted similar RFRA statutes and which single out same-sex couples, see Marci A. Hamilton, States That Permit
Discrimination against Same-Sex Marriage Couples, archived at http://perma.cc/8LD7BM5C (RFRA Perils).
53 This evidence-based, more-measured approach to religious institutions is evident
in sex abuse cases across the United States and at the Supreme Court. Even when the
Court held that the First Amendment creates a "ministerial exception," it suggested that
the exception may not immunize nonecclesiastical decisions regarding ministries. See
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S Ct 694, 710 (2012) ("We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract
or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.").
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that the next president will appoint someone to fill Scalia's chair.
A Republican president who continues in the same vein as recent
Republican presidents would likely appoint someone in line with
Scalia's views on the Establishment Clause and further erode the
separation of church and state, at the same time the candidate
may favor an extreme reading of RFRA. While this in my view is
a threat to liberty for all Americans, these extreme interpretations have been a harbinger for RFRA's deconstruction.54 That
means Scalia's anti-Establishment Clause views likely would be
revived, and there would be further deterioration of the principle
of separation of church and state. The impact on the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause is less likely to be significant. Conversely, a Democratic president is likely to appoint someone who
will revive the separation of church and state, creating a solid
majority of five on these issues, and who has a healthy understanding of the need to govern and accommodate religion in a way
that protects liberty and the vulnerable at the same time.

54 Marci A. Hamilton,
http://perma.cc/8LD7-BM5C.
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